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Abstract: 
So-called online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become very popular 
all over Europe. Millions of voters are using them as an assistance to make up 
their minds for which party they should vote. Despite this popularity there are 
only very few studies about the impact of these tools on individual electoral 
choice. On the basis of the Swiss VAA smartvote we present some first findings 
about the question whether VAAs do have a direct impact on the actual vote of 
their users. In deed, we find strong evidence that Swiss voters were affected by 
smartvote. However, our findings are somewhat contrary to the results of previous 
studies from other countries. Furthermore, the quality of available data for such 
studies needs to be improved. Future studies should pay attention to both: the 
improvement of the available data, as well as the explanation of the large variance 
of findings between the specific European countries. 
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Introduction 
 
During the last couple of years so-called online Voting Advice Applications 
(VAAs) have become increasingly popular in many countries all over Europe. Of 
course there exists a large diversity of VAAs with regard to their design as well as 
the features they offer, but at the end of the day they all share the same key 
function: VAAs are websites providing voters with information about which 
political party or which candidate comes closest to their own political values and 
policy preferences. In order to do that they proceed in three steps: First, the voters 
are asked to create their political profile by filling in a questionnaire on different 
political issues. Second, the VAA compares their answers with the positions of 
parties or candidates on these issues. And finally, voters are provided with a 
voting recommendation in form of a list ranking parties or candidates according to 
the degree of their issue congruence with the particular voter. 
With a view to the development of the number of people using VAAs they 
really seem to meet the needs of voters – or at least of a large part of the 
electorate. The first operational VAA was the Dutch Stemwijzer1. It went online 
for the first time in 1998 and provided 250’000 voting advices. This figure 
exploded to 4.7 million voting advices in 2006 – this equals 40% of the Dutch 
electorate (Walgrave et al. 2008:52). In 2006 additional 1.5 million voting advices 
were provided by another Dutch VAA called Kieskompas2 (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 
2007). In Switzerland the VAA smartvote3 could increase the number of 
generated voting advices from 255’000 in 2003 to almost one million in 2007 
(Ladner et al. 2010), whereas in Germany the Wahl-O-Mat4 started with 3.6 
million voting advices in 2002 general elections (Marschall 2005), and delivered 
over 6.7 million voting advices during the campaign of the 2009 elections 
(Marschall 2009). These are just a few examples for the fast-growing popularity 
of VAAs. Beside the mentioned countries, VAAs have also become part of 
electoral campaigns in countries like Austria, Belgium, Finland, or Luxembourg. 
There is hardly any country in Europe without an own VAA. 
Despite this obvious popularity VAAs have been in general widely 
neglected as a research topic by political scientists. Only very few publication are 
dealing with VAAs. Furthermore, until a few years ago most of the publications 
on VAAs were focusing on pure descriptions of VAAs and their functionality 
(e.g. Liebhart and Wassermair 2003, Jeitziner and Fivaz 2005, Fivaz and Schwarz 
                                                
1 http://www.stemwijzer.nl 
2 http://www.kieskompas.nl 
3 http://www.smartvote.ch 
4 http://www.wahl-o-mat.de 
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2007). It is hard to find analytically or empirically oriented studies among the 
publications of this “first wave”.5 However, this is changing slightly and in the 
last two to three years a steadily growing number of studies on VAAs have been 
published, and in addition to that the more recent studies have also gained by 
focusing increasingly on empirical analyses and developing a more critical 
perspective. 
Rütsche (2008), for instance, is addressing the legal foundations of VAAs 
and is debating the requirement of certain standards to which VAAs should adapt. 
From his point of view any particular VAA should guarantee equal treatment of 
all parties and candidates, and also a high level of transparency with regard to the 
applied statistical methods of the issue-matching procedure, as well as regarding 
how and by whom it is financed. 
Another critical article is the one of Ramonaité (2010). On the basis of 
data from a Lithuanian VAA6 she sees some evidence that VAAs offer some 
advantages to populist parties and the danger of promoting strategic behavior of 
such parties. In contrast to other parties, populist parties can switch their policy 
positions to the supposed positions of the median voter on short notice before the 
elections and therefore benefit particularly from the services offered by VAAs. 
With regard to Ramonaité’s findings a study from Switzerland by Schwarz 
et al. (2010) shows – at least partly – contradictory results. Schwarz et al. 
compared the policy positions of candidates before elections (based on their 
answers to a Swiss VAA) with the legislative behavior of the elected 
candidates/MPs after elections (based on roll-call data). There were no signs of a 
widespread use of strategic behavior of candidates. On the contrary, the 
overwhelming majority of elected candidates acted, once they were in parliament, 
according to their policy preferences revealed in the VAA before the elections. 
Most of the VAAs claim to increase political interest and participation 
among voters by offering an additional channel of information and a new way of 
support in their decision-making process. And indeed, first evidence indicates a 
positive correlation between the use of VAAs and voter turnout. The analyses for 
the 2006 elections in the Netherlands of Rusuuvirta and Rosema (2009) suggest 
that VAAs had a modest effect on voter turnout. This finding is supported by 
similar analyses for the case of Switzerland. It can be shown that the use of VAAs 
correlates with a higher voter turnout in general, but strongest effects are found by 
women and young and first-time voters (Fivaz 2008, Fivaz and Nadig 2010, 
Ladner et al. 2010). 
                                                
5 There are empirically oriented studies, but they are often dealing with the policy positions of 
candidates and parties based on data generated by VAAs, but they are not dealing with VAAs and 
their use in particular (e.g. Ladner et al. 2008 and Ladner et al. 2010b). 
6 http://www.manobalsas.lt 
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Without doubt all the above-mentioned studies are dealing with important 
aspects of VAAs and their use, but they do not address more interesting and far-
reaching questions: Do VAAs affect the decision-making of voters using them? 
And subsequently, do VAAs have an impact on the electoral choice of voters 
using them? In this paper we address these questions on the basis of the 2007 
elections in Switzerland using data gathered from surveys among voters using the 
Swiss VAA smartvote. 
The next section gives a short introduction into the theoretical 
background, whereas the third section provides some necessary background 
information about the Swiss electoral and party system as well as about smartvote. 
In the forth section, we present our analyses on the impact of smartvote on voters’ 
decision-making and electoral choice. Finally, in the last section we summarize 
the results, evaluate them critically, and offer some suggestions for further 
studies. 
 
 
Theoretical background 
 
Since there is hardly any theoretical oriented literature on VAAs to be found, we 
are bound to apply findings and debates out of the general literature on electoral 
behavior in order to gain some theoretical foundations for to the above raised 
question on the expected impact of VAAs on electoral decision-making. 
What determines the electoral choice of voters? State-of-the-art theories 
on electoral behavior stress – besides other factors such as party attachment, and 
the affection to candidates– the prominent role of issue voting (Niemi and 
Weisberg 2001: 14). A large number of studies show the decisive importance of 
political parties’ issues positions on a voter’s electoral choice (e.g. Alvarez and 
Nagler 2000, Powell 2000, Kriesi and Sciarini 2003 (for the case of Switzerland), 
or Schoen and Weiss 2005). 
Klein (2006: 595) emphasizes also the importance of issue voting and 
describes, according to normative democratic theories, the ideal voter as follows: 
The ideal voter informs himself carefully about all the pressing political issues 
and the positions of political parties towards them. Then the voter compares the 
parties’ positions with his own preferences and makes the voting decision based 
on this matching. Furthermore Klein offers a direct link to VAAs by remarking 
that the services provided by VAAs come very close to this normative ideal type 
for electoral decision-making. And Klein is not alone with this point of view (see 
e.g. Jeitziner 2004). 
All VAAs are based on the conceptions of spatial voting or to be more 
precise on the famous proximity-model of Downs (1957). Downs’ original model 
was a very simple one based on an election with only one issue dimension 
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(usually the left-right dimension) and only two competing candidates. According 
to Downs a voter will vote for the candidate, which is closer to his own position 
on the issue dimension. Over the following decades the model was adapted to 
more and more complex electoral systems (e.g. multi-seats and multi-party 
systems, or systems with open lists; see e.g. Cox 1997), and the model was also 
extended in direction of the inclusion of multiple issue dimensions instead of only 
one. Today the proximity-voting model is often criticized on the grounds that the 
average voter is not willing or even capable to gather and process all the 
necessary information to perform the demanded comparison of policy positions. 
This might be possible in the original model, but clearly not in elections with 
multiple parties debating on a large number of political issues (Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald 1989). 
With regard to this critique concerning voters’ limited information 
collecting and information processing capacities VAAs seem to offer an 
interesting solution. VAAs reduce voters’ information and transaction costs at 
large. They provide easy accessible information on policy positions of political 
parties and not only for one issue but for a large number of issues. Supported by a 
VAA everyone is capable to conduct his own, personalized issue matching with 
all the relevant political parties within a couple of minutes. The large number of 
voters using VAAs (see the examples in the preceding section) seems to support 
this view. VAAs are obviously offering services needed and appreciated by 
voters. This leads us to the following twofold assumption: First, we suppose that 
voters see VAAs not merely as toys, which offer entertainment for people 
interested in politics, but they see them as serious tools, providing needed advice. 
And second, we assume that VAAs have an impact on the electoral choice of 
voters using them. 
The assumption that VAAs have an impact on the electoral choice is 
backed up by an observation about voters’ party attachment. Party attachment is 
seen within the social-psychological theory of voting as one of the main factors to 
explain voting decisions (e.g. Schoen and Weiss 2005). However, the last ten to 
20 years showed a constant decline of voters’ party attachments (e.g. a decline in 
party memberships or an increasing number of swing voters) in almost all 
advanced democracies (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, or Dalton 2006). Since 
this evident decline, the explanatory power of party attachments for the electoral 
choice seems questionable. And it leads also to the assumption that voters might 
be more open to seek cues with respect to their voting decision. 
Even though there are – from a theoretical point of view – several good 
reasons to assume that VAAs affect voters’ electoral choice, the results of the few 
existing empirical studies on this topic show contradictory results. Walgrave et al. 
(2008) analyzed the Belgian VAA ‘Stemtest’ (‘Do the Vote Test’) and its impact 
on voters during the 2004 election campaign in Belgium. They found indeed 
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evidence that the ‘Stemtest’ had affected Belgian voters in their electoral choice 
but only on a very modest level. These findings about a limited effect of VAAs 
are somewhat in contrast to other studies. Both Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2007) as 
well as Rusuuvirta and Rosema (2009) found evidence that in elections in the 
Netherlands VAAs played an important role and had a clear impact on the voting 
decision of Dutch voters. 
 
 
Background information: The Swiss Electoral System and the 
Swiss VAA smartvote 
 
The Swiss Electoral System 
 
The functioning of VAAs, the intensity of their use by voters, and their usefulness 
to them depend to a great extent to the particular design of the electoral and the 
party systems in the different countries in which the VAAs are operating. It makes 
a difference whether voters have to decide only between two candidates from two 
parties running for one seat or whether they can choose among a large number of 
candidates from several political parties.  
Switzerland is despite its small size a very heterogeneous country. Its 
linguistic, economic, socio-cultural and political heterogeneity is reflected by a 
distinct federalism and a highly fragmented party system (Ladner 2002). It is 
characteristic for Swiss parties that they are organized in a very decentralized 
manner with cantonal and local sections disposing of far-reaching autonomy and 
independence. It is not unusual that on important national issues there are 
different political positions within the same national party. Switzerland is divided 
into 26 cantons. Every of these cantons has its own party system depending on 
aspects like prevailing denomination, language, if the canton is a rural or an urban 
one, or the structure of the cantonal economy. Regarding the number of parties or 
the degree of party competition these cantonal party systems differ widely 
(Ladner 2004 and 2004b). This is also very important with regard to the elections 
for the national parliament. Of course the parties are running national campaigns, 
but an important part of campaigning takes place on the cantonal level and takes 
into account the particular circumstances in the different cantons. It is often said 
that Switzerland has not one national election instead it has 26 cantonal elections 
held on the same day. 
Additionally, for the national elections a system of pure proportional 
representation without any thresholds (like the 5%-threshold in Germany) is 
applied. This leads to a further fragmentation of the party system. Whereas there 
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are to find only five parties in the German parliament,7 there are not less than 
twelve parties in the Swiss parliament – and only six of them have five seats or 
more.8 
Electoral districts for the national elections are the 26 cantons. The 200 
seats of the first chamber – the National Council – are assigned to the cantons 
according to the number of their inhabitants. Thus the constituencies differ largely 
in their size. Whereas the six smallest cantons have only one seat, the canton of 
Zurich, as the largest canton, has 34 seats.  
Furthermore, the electoral system offers voters various possibilities to 
express their preferences. The electoral choice of Swiss voters is not only 
restricted to parties. Due to an applied open list system they also have the 
possibility to vote for single candidates. Every voter has as many votes, as there 
are seats in his constituency (e.g. in the small canton of Uri with one seat, voters 
have only one vote, and in the much larger canton of Zurich with 34 seats they 
have 34 votes). Voters can split their votes between candidates from different 
parties (e.g. in the canton of Zurich a voter can give four votes to candidates from 
party A, ten to candidates from party B and 20 to candidates from party C). This 
is called “Panaschieren”. In order to allow voters to support particularly those 
candidates they like most, voters can support their favourite candidates by giving 
them two votes instead of one (so-called cumulative voting; e.g. in the canton of 
Zurich a voter could vote for 17 candidates with two votes for each). These rules 
allow voters to compose a customized ballot according to their personal political 
preferences.9 
One effect of this electoral system is that voting in Switzerland is 
particularly complex business. For example in the 2007 elections in the canton of 
Zurich a voter had to choose among not less than 29 party lists and 804 
candidates. For voters who intend to base their electoral choice on political 
positions it is obviously a lot more demanding to gather all the necessary 
information in Switzerland than in a country with a two-party system. But this is 
also a good opportunity for VAAs to offer a useful service, as long as it takes into 
account the special needs due to the electoral system. A VAA for the Swiss 
national elections has thus to offer two things: First, it should be able to deliver 
voting recommendations for both whole parties and single candidates. And 
second, it has to offer voting specific voting recommendations for each 
                                                
7 http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/plenum/sitzverteilung.html. 
8 http://www.parlament.ch/d/dokumentation/statistiken/Seiten/zusammensetzung-nr-nach-
wahlen.aspx. 
9 Swiss voters seem to appreciate these possibilities increasingly. Not only the share of swing 
voters has increased in the last years, but also the share of those using the possibilities offered by 
the electoral system to compose their customized ballots (vote splitting and cumulative voting) 
according to their individual preferences (Burger 2001). 
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constituency and – due to the lack of intra-party coherence – allow different 
answers by several cantonal sections of the same party to one question. 
 
 
smartvote – Introduction into a Swiss VAA 
 
smartvote was developed in 2002 and 2003 in consideration of the special 
requirements of a VAA in Switzerland by the Swiss non-profit organization 
Politools. The core of smartvote is like in all VAAs the issue-matching module. 
But unlike the other VAAs it collects data not only from the party but also from 
the candidate level. A couple of month before the elections, all candidates receive 
the smartvote questionnaire, either by e-mail or by postal mail and they are asked 
to answer the questionnaire completely and to return it. The questionnaire 
consisted in 2007 of more than 70 questions on the most important political issues 
(like e.g., “Do you think that nuclear power plants should be shut down?”). 
Possible answers are “yes”, “rather yes”, “rather no” and “no”. Candidates do not 
have an opting-out possibility. They have to answer all questions and confirm 
their answers before they are saved in the smartvote database. 
About two months before the elections the smartvote website is made 
accessible to the voters and leads them in three steps to their individual voting 
recommendation. First, voters have to specify their political profile. They are 
asked to answer the same questionnaire as the candidates but they can choose 
between a “deluxe version” consisting of all questions and a “rapid version” 
consisting of 36 questions only. Unlike the candidates the voters have also a “no 
answer” option if they wish to leave out a number of questions, and they can 
weigh the answers according to the importance the issues have for them. The 
website provides voters with additional background information including pros 
and cons for each question. Second, voters have to select the constituency for 
which they want to receive a voting recommendation, and they have also to 
decide whether they wish to receive a voting recommendation on the level of 
parties or on the level of individual candidates. Third, smartvote compares the 
voters’ answers with the answers of parties or candidates including the voters’ 
weighting factors. As result the voters receive voting recommendations in the 
form of individualized “matching-lists” with a decreasing ranking of parties or 
candidates according to their matching with the voters’ answers. 
The website provides also visualizations for political profiles: the so-
called smartspider and smartmap charts (for examples see Figure 1). Both 
analytical graphs are based on the candidates’ answers to the smartvote 
questionnaire. The smartspider shows the agreement or disagreement on eight 
major policy dimensions formulated as political goals (e.g. more law and order, 
more environmental protection, or a strong welfare state) in a spider net graph. 
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The smartmap is based on a system of coordinates with two major ideological 
cleavages serving as axes – the “north-south axis” for the cleavage between 
liberal and conservative standpoints and the “west-east axis” for the left-right 
cleavage.  
 
Figure 1: Examples for smartspider (left graph) and smartmap (right graph) 
  
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
 
smartvote went online for the first time in June 2003 at the start of the campaign 
for the national elections. Slightly more than 50% of the candidates participated 
and answered the questionnaire. In the following years smartvote offered its 
services also at several dozens of cantonal and local elections. With every election 
covered the website could increase its popularity and gain more and more media 
partners. This made it possible that in 2007 smartvote was regarded as ordinary 
part of the electoral campaign. More than 30 media partners (print media as well 
as TV and radio broadcasters) supported smartvote and integrated the tool and its 
analyses (e.g. the smartspider-graphs of important candidates) into their own 
news coverage. Due to the cooperation with media partners smartvote was not 
only present online, it was also present in offline media. With regard to this broad 
coverage it is not surprising that in the 2007 elections the number of participating 
candidates increased considerably: out of the 3’100 candidates 85% revealed their 
political preferences by answering the smartvote-questionnaire. And also the 
number of voting recommendations grew from 255’000 in 2003 to almost one 
million in 2007. 
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The Impact of smartvote on the Electoral Choice 
 
The Data 
 
The analyses in this section are based on three online-surveys conducted among 
voters using smartvote before and after the 2007 elections. The surveys were 
conducted by the IP16 “smart-voting” research project10 in cooperation with 
Politools – the NGO operating smartvote. 
Starting point was a pre-election survey. When voters received their 
voting recommendation on the smartvote website, they were also asked whether 
they would agree to participate in an additional scientific survey. 13’361 voters 
agreed and filled in the survey. At the end of this survey participants were asked if 
they would also answer a second survey after the elections. Out of the 9’930 
voters who agreed to do this, 4’331 voters also filled in the second post-electoral 
survey. 
Parallel to this a third survey was conducted among all the smartvote 
users, who had created a user account on the website. This was also a post-
electoral survey. Shortly after the elections all voters with a smartvote user 
account received an e-mail and were asked to support the research project by 
answering an online survey. A total of 80’225 voters owned a user account and 
out of these 13’959 filled in the survey. 
The questionnaires of these surveys were designed in a way that allows for 
merging them into one dataset. Thus, we created a combined dataset with a total 
of 27’320 respondents. There were some differences between the pre-electoral 
and the two post-electoral surveys. Whereas questions about the socio-
demographic profile of smartvote users (e.g. age, gender, educational level or 
political orientation) were part of all surveys (maximal N = 27’320), some 
questions concerning the actual electoral choice could only be asked in the two 
post-electoral surveys (maximal N = 18’290). 
A last point we have to address is the question about the explanatory 
power of this dataset. Is it possible to draw a representative picture of the voters 
using smartvote based on this data? We lack of reliable information of the target 
population and with a view to the design of the data collection one can expect 
several processes of self-selection. At the end of the day it is not possible to give a 
final answer to this question. The large number of respondents does not guarantee 
a sufficient representativeness of the dataset. But if we compare the respondents’ 
                                                
10 For details about the research project see http://www.nccr-
democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-voting/smart-voting. 
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socio-demographic profile with findings of similar studies for other countries and 
other VAAs as well as with results from studies on Internet use in general (e.g. 
Marschall 2005 or Wall et al. 2009) we find very similar patterns. Therefore, we 
can assume that this dataset offers a sufficient quality, which is at least 
comparable with the state of the art of research on VAAs in other countries. 
And finally, the lack of representativeness is only important if we try to 
estimate the overall impact of smartvote on the electoral outcome. If we simply 
try to find out whether smartvote has an impact or not, the look at a specific group 
of the population – those using smartvote – is sufficient.  
 
 
First Analyses: Influence of smartvote on the Decision-Making and the Final 
Voting Decision 
 
The conducted post-electoral surveys among smartvote users contained a number 
of questions aiming directly on measuring the potential impact of smartvote. One 
part of these questions focused on the impact on political participation. Previous 
studies indicate that there is a positive effect with regard to the political 
participation especially among young and first time voters and women (Fivaz 
2008, Fivaz and Nadig 2010). Another part of these surveys addressed the 
question, whether the use of smartvote had a direct influence on the voting 
decision or not; and if yes, how exactly smartvote affected voters using it. 
Asked directly 67% of respondents stated that smartvote had affected their 
voting decision. These findings differ to a large extent from results of similar 
studies for Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. According to Marschall 
(2005) in Germany only 6% of voters using a VAA were directly affected in their 
electoral decision, and also in Belgium VAAs had only an impact on a few 
percent of their users (Walgrave et al. 2008). Research results for the Netherlands 
show higher values (Kees and van der Kolk 2007), but with 15% there is still a 
significant difference to the 67% we found for Switzerland. We will come back 
on this aspect later. 
In the following tables we present some simple statistics about the 
influence of smartvote on different user groups. Table 1a shows the share of 
influenced users with regard to age, gender and educational level. 
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Table 1a: Influence of smartvote on voting decision 
Share of smartvote users (voters) influenced in their voting decision 
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
    
Age groups    
18-24 71 29 3’346 
25-34 73 27 4’759 
35-44 68 32 3’461 
45-54 59 41 2’400 
55-64 54 46 1’637 
65+ 48 52 711 
    
Gender    
Male 65 35 11’382 
Female 70 30 4’968 
    
Educational Level    
Low 69 31 490 
Middle 66 34 5’850 
High 67 33 9’774 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
 
Table 1a shows that there are only minor differences between voters with regard 
to the educational level or gender. The by far largest differences are to be found 
between the several age groups. The influence of smartvote on the voting decision 
is the strongest among young voters. 
In one of the preceding sections we provided a short introduction into the 
Swiss electoral system. One of the most important aspects of this electoral system 
is the large difference between the cantons (electoral districts) with regard to the 
number of seats (M) and subsequently the number of candidates (C) running for a 
seat.11 In Table 1b we compare the ration between C and M – with other words: 
the number of candidates per seat – with the impact of smartvote on its users. The 
more candidates running for a seat the more information has to be gathered and 
processed by voters. Thus, the already mentioned information problem of voters is 
most pressing in those constituencies with the highest C/M-ratio. Due to this 
aspect we would assume that VAAs are most intensively used in constituencies 
with a high C/M-ratio, and that VAAs have also their strongest influence in these 
constituencies. 
                                                
11 In the literature on the effects of electoral systems on the outcome of elections “M” is used as 
the abbreviation for the number of seats, whereas for the number of Candidates a “C” is applied 
(see e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995 or Cox 1997). 
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Table 1b: Influence of smartvote on voting decision (continuation) 
Share of smartvote users (voters) influenced in their voting decision 
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
    
C/M-ratio1    
1 22 78 46 
3 13 87 16 
4 33 67 42 
7 52 48 103 
8 31 69 99 
9 54 46 474 
10 50 50 221 
11 59 41 1’087 
12 60 40 2’514 
13 72 28 1’147 
16 68 32 1’448 
18 62 38 407 
19 66 34 1’453 
20 72 28 3’376 
24 72 28 3’941 
Total 67 33 16’374 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) C/M-ratio: the numerical relation between the number of candidates (C) and the number of seats (M) in a 
particular constituency. The higher the C/M-ratio the more candidates are competing against each other per seat. 
 
Indeed, Table 1b supports our assumption. The higher the C/M-ratio in a 
constituency the more smartvote users were affected in their voting decision by 
the voting recommendation they received. 
Finally, Table 1c contains the findings with regard to political attitudes 
like the ideological self-positioning and the party choice (we only included the six 
most important parties). 
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Table 1c: Influence of smartvote on voting decision (continuation) 
Share of voters influenced by smartvote in their voting decision 
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
 
Ideological Self-Positioning1 
Left-wing 68 32 7’593 
Centre 70 30 4’804 
Right-wing 58 42 3’623 
 
Party Choice2 
CVP 64 36 1’653 
FDP 64 36 2’346 
SVP 49 51 1’522 
SP 66 34 4’696 
GPS 71 29 2’918 
GLP 80 20 1’181 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) The ideological position was measured with an eleven point scale (from “0” for left tot “10” for right. The 
answers were recoded as follows: 0 to 3 = left-wing; 4 to 6 = centre; 7 to 10 = right-wing. 2) CVP = Christian-democrats; 
FDP = Liberal-democrats; SVP = National-conservatives; SP = Social democrats; GPS = Greens; GLP = Green-liberals. 
 
The results from Table 1c do not provide a stringent picture or at least one, which 
is easy to explain. It is common for both the ideological self-positioning and the 
party choice that right wing voters have been affected to a smaller degree than 
centre or left-wing voters. With regard to party choice smartvote had its strongest 
impact on the voters of the Green-liberals (GLP). At least this aspect can be 
explained. The GLP was in 2007 a new party participating for the very first time 
in a national election. The GLP positioned itself as a party between the left-wing 
parties like the Greens and the Social democrats on the one side and the classic 
centre parties like the Liberal or the Catholic-conservatives. The party program 
combined a strong focus on environmental issues (e.g. global warming) with 
moderate positions with regard to the economy, taxing or migration policy. Thus, 
they addressed successfully two groups of voters: First, the moderate voters of the 
left and the centre, who had become disappointed by the other parties, and 
welcomed the GLP as new alternative. Second, beside these swing voters the GLP 
could gain a number of young and first-time voters. Both groups have in common 
that they have only weak party alignments. For such voters a VAA is an ideal tool 
to seek for support with regard to the electoral choice, therefore the result of the 
GLP in Table 1c is not unexpected. 
With regard to the Swiss electoral system voters have at their disposal 
multiple options to express their political preferences on their ballot. Voters using 
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smartvote were also asked in which way they have been affected in their electoral 
choice (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Influence of smartvote on the voting decision (in percentage)  
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
    
Did you copy the smartvote recommendation without 
any changes onto your voting list? 15 85 10’650 
Based on the smartvote recommendation, did you 
rather vote for candidates from different lists (vote-
splitting)? 
61 39 10’580 
Based on the smartvote recommendation, did you 
vote for parties and candidates, which you would 
otherwise not have voted for? 
67 33 10’559 
Based on the smartvote recommendation, did you 
abstain from voting for parties and candidates you 
would otherwise have voted for? 
35 65 10’372 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
 
According to Table 2 only a small number of voters copied the voting 
recommendation without any changes on to their ballot. This indicates that VAAs 
do not produce a kind of an “instant voter”, whose voting decision is completely 
computer-generated without own deliberations. In fact the opposite seems to be 
true. As we can see from Table 2 most of the voters used the voting 
recommendation to refine their ballot. Due to smartvote they split their vote more 
often and also voted for more often for candidates, which they otherwise would 
have overlooked. These findings come along with evidence from another study, 
which could show, that users do not trust smartvote blindly, but that they use it as 
a starting point for gathering further information about the candidates ranking 
highest in their voting recommendation (Fivaz and Nadig 2010). 
The findings presented in this section so far show that smartvote has a 
significant impact on the voting decision of its users. Even though not all users are 
affected to the same degree, the impact on all groups of users is on an average 
level several times higher than it is observed in other countries. Nevertheless, the 
findings are also somewhat questionable, and they should be dealt with some 
caution. First, one should keep in mind that the presented analyses are based on 
surveys, which deal with the problem of self-selection among its respondents. It is 
plausible to consider, that users, which are pleased with smartvote and its 
outcome are more likely to fill in this additional survey, than users, which are 
disappointed with it. Second and more important, Walgrave et al. (2008) show 
evidence that users’ subjective perceptions about the impact of a VAA on their 
actual electoral choice are often misleading. They tend to overrate the impact of 
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VAAs. In the following section we try to overcome this problem by applying an 
additional method to assess the impact of smartvote. 
 
 
In-Depth Analyses: Swing Voters Among smartvote Users 
 
As presented in the previous section a large majority of smartvote users stated that 
the tool has affected their vote choice. However, we likewise mentioned that we 
do not know whether this influence was actually exercised at the polls. As 
Walgrave et al.’s (2008) study on the 2004 Belgian elections suggests the VAAs 
did affect first of all people’s vote intentions and only to a lesser extent their 
actual vote. Thus, we will now apply a new indicator to measure the impact of 
smartvote. Instead of the direct question used in the preceding section, we will use 
swing voters as a kind of an alternative, indirect impact measurement. 
Swing voters were defined as voters who had voted in 2007 for a different 
party than in the previous elections in 2003.12 Regarding the kind of services 
VAAs are offering it seems very likely that VAAs are especially interesting for 
swing voters. The numbers presented in Table 3 confirm this view. Swing voters 
were affected at a much larger degree by smartvote than the other voters (73% to 
56%). 
 
Table 3: Swing voters influenced by smartvote in their voting decision 
 Influenced by smartvote 
 Yes (%) No (%) N 
    
Swing voters    
Yes 73 27 4’426 
No 56 44 7’136 
    
Total 63 37 11’562 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
 
The following tables are structured the same way as Tables 1a to 1c and present 
the share of swing voters among several specific groups. 
                                                
12 With this definition some voters dropped out of our data sample (e.g. those who were to young 
to vote in 2003 or those who could not remember anymore for which party they had voted in 
2003). 
- 16 - 
 
Table 4a: Share of swing voters among age, gender and education levels (in percentage) 
Share of swing voters 
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
    
Age groups    
18-24 41 59 1’066 
25-34 43 57 3’512 
35-44 40 60 2’842 
45-54 34 66 2’121 
55-64 33 67 1’473 
65+ 28 72 677 
    
Gender    
Male 38 62 8’678 
Female 38 62 3’039 
    
Educational Level    
Low 22 78 59 
Middle 39 61 3’476 
High 38 62 8’038 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
 
There are no differences between women and men – at least with regard to the 
results in Table 4c. The share of swing voters is also almost identical between 
voters with a high and a medium educational level. However, among voters with 
only a low educational level there is a very low share of swing voters. Finally, the 
most distinct differences are to be found with regard to the age groups. The older 
the voters are the less swing voters can be found in those age groups. 
The results in Table 4b go along with the expectations we had. With 
regard to the relevant literature (e.g. Cox 1997) it is to be expected that – under a 
proportional voting rule – there is a positive relation between the number of seats 
and the number of parties or candidates competing about those: with increasing 
number of seats there is also an increase of parties and candidates. In 
constituencies with a large number of candidates per seat voters have more 
options at their disposal, which should in turn increase the likelihood for more 
swing voting – at least this was our assumption. Table 4b seems to confirm this 
assumption: In constituencies with a large M/C-ratio swing voting is more 
frequent. 
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Table 4b: Share of swing voters in relation to choices per seat (continuation) 
Share of swing voters 
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
    
C/M-ratio1    
1 25 76 32 
3 33 67 12 
4 50 50 22 
7 24 76 68 
8 26 74 69 
9 38 62 329 
10 30 70 156 
11 30 7 794 
12 35 65 1’806 
13 32 68 794 
16 38 62 1’042 
18 28 72 305 
19 38 62 1’006 
20 38 62 2’495 
24 47 53 2’800 
Total 38 62 11’730 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) C/M-ratio: the numerical relation between the number of candidates (C) and the number of seats (M) in a 
particular constituency. The higher the C/M-ratio the more are candidates competing against each other per seat. 
 
Table 4c is addressing aspects of ideological and political positions. According to 
the ideological self-positioning of voters on the left-right axis there are more 
swing voters among those who position themselves in the centre of the scale. In 
terms of party choice there is a little bit of a different picture. We find the highest 
shares of swing voters among parties of the left and the left part of the centre 
(GPS, CVP and Green-liberals). On first sight, the case of the Green-liberals with 
a share of 100% of swing voters is surprising. But one should keep in mind that 
this party was the first time participating in a national election in 2007. Thus, by 
definition all of their voters must be swing voters. 
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Table 4c: Share of swing voters (continuation) 
Share of swing voters  
 Yes (%) No (%) N (=100%) 
 
Ideological Self-Positioning1 
Left-wing 36 64 5’414 
Centre 48 52 3’398 
Right-wing 31 69 2’734 
 
Party Choice2 
CVP 44 56 1’233 
FDP 25 75 1’824 
SVP 28 72 1’124 
SP 14 86 3’491 
GPS 58 42 2’096 
GLP 100 0 803 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) The ideological position was measured with an eleven point scale (from “0” for left to “10” for right. The 
answers were recoded as follows: 0 to 3 = left-wing; 4 to 6 = centre; 7 to 10 = right-wing. 2) CVP = Christian-democrats; 
FDP = Liberal-democrats; SVP = National-conservatives; SP = Social democrats; GPS = Greens; GLP = Green-liberals. 
 
In order to assess the impact of smartvote, we need to answer the question 
whether there is a positive correlation between using the tool and being a swing 
voter or not. We try to find an answer by conducting a multivariate analysis. We 
conducted a logistic regression analysis in order to predict a change in the 
electoral choice between the 2003 and 2007 elections. Table 4 contains the 
corresponding results. 
The dependent variable in our regression is the change of the electoral 
choice. Furthermore, the regression contains nine independent and control 
variables and a constant. The most important of those is of course a dummy 
variable measuring, whether voters had stated that they had been influence by 
smartvote or not. We assumed that voters who had been surprised by the result of 
the smartvote voting advice were more likely to switch the party they voted for. 
Thus, we included also a corresponding variable, which indicates whether a voter 
was surprised by the received smartvote voting advice or not. We also controlled 
for the general openness with regard to a party change and for party attachment. 
Both variables were coded by using the so-called “propensity to vote”-questions. 
The survey contained a battery of questions, which asked voters on an eleven-
point scale about the propensities to vote for the most important parties. The first 
variable was coded as “yes” if a voter had a high propensity to vote (8 or higher) 
for one or more parties different to the party they had actually voted for; the latter 
was coded as “yes” if a voter showed a high propensity to vote for at least one 
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party at all. Moreover, it is to expect that voters with a general moderate centre-
position are more likely to swing vote than voters with a position on the left or the 
right pole of the ideological spectrum. Therefore, we took into account also the 
centre-position of a voter as a control variable. We already mentioned in this 
section our assumption that a large number of candidates competing per available 
seat is making swing voting more likely. Thus, we also included the already 
introduced M/C-ratio as a further control variable into the regression. Finally, we 
also included the standard socio-demographic factors like gender, age and 
educational level of voters as control variables. 
 
Table 5: Logit predictions for party change 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
       
Affected by smartvote .349 .091 14.536 1 .000 1.417 
Surprised by voting recommendation .141 .060 5.524 1 .019 1.151 
Openness to party change  .297 .107 7.658 1 .006 1.346 
Party attachment -.434 .087 24.693 1 .000 .648 
Centre position .385 .088 18.968 1 .000 1.469 
M/C-ratio of constituencies .033 .008 15.551 1 .000 1.033 
Age -.180 .032 30.997 1 .000 .836 
Gender -.105 .096 1.183 1 .277 .901 
Educational level -.073 .086 .720 1 .396 .929 
Constant -.945 .332 8.097 1 .004 .389 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) Dependent variable is party change: binary coding, 0 = same party choice 2003 and 2007, 1= different party 
choice between 2003 and 2007. 2) N = 2’664, -2 Log likelihood= 3396.121, Cox&Snell R-Square= .060, Nagelkerke R 
Square= .082, % of correctly predicted cases = 63.3%, chi-square= 166.108 with p-2s=0.000. 
 
The explanatory variable – being influenced by smartvote – proved to be a 
significant predictor for swing voting. The positive correlation shows that using 
smartvote increases the likelihood for swing voting. 
With exception of gender and educational level all of the control variables 
were also significant. The positive correlation between being a swing voter and 
being surprised by the received voting advice can be interpreted as a further 
confirmation of the impact of smartvote on the voting behavior. The outcome with 
regard to the other control variables was as expected: party attachment seems to 
be a negative predictor for party change, whereas the general openness for party 
change and the ideological centre-position are positive predictors of swing voters 
and increase significantly the likelihood of a party change. Facing a larger set of 
choices among candidates (a high M/C-ratio) also predicts higher odds for party 
change. With other words, those voters with more options to change their vote to 
another party are also more likely to be swing voters. With regard to the socio-
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demographic factors, only age significantly predicts the likelihood for party 
change. 
All things considered, the regression analysis supports our assumption that 
voters see smartvote as a serious and useful tool for their decision-making and 
that it affects also their actual vote. Thus, the findings in this section come along 
with those of the previous section. And there is also a further argument that 
supports our assumption. As already mentioned our definition of swing voters 
excluded all the young voters who were eligible to vote in 2007 for the first time. 
On the other hand, above all the young voters are those who are most affected by 
smartvote as seen in Table 1a. Thus, it is not to be expected that analyses that 
include the young voters would come to totally different findings. Although we do 
find significant effects in our analysis presented above, we have to state that the 
overall model quality is weak (see remarks for Table 5). 
At the end of this section we try to give a first estimation about the impact 
of smartvote on the specific political parties. We present some findings about the 
flow of voters between the parties in Table 6. The analyses presented in Table 6 
included only swing voters who had stated in the surveys that they had been 
influenced by smartvote. 
 
Table 6: Party change between the 2003 and 2007 elections among those who were influenced in their 
vote decision by smartvote 
Party voted for in 2007 
Party voted for in 2003 CVP FDP SVP SP GPS GLP Total 
 
N 59 17 55 41 62 234 CVP % 
 
25.2 7.3 23.5 17.5 26.5 100.0 
N 152 99 46 45 135 477 FDP % 31.9 
 
20.8 9.6 9.4 28.3 100.0 
N 48 89 19 9 23 188 SVP % 25.5 47.3 
 
10.1% 4.8 12.2 100.0 
N 135 137 22 728 251 1’273 SP % 10.6 10.8 1.7 
 
57.2 19.7 100.0 
N 28 16 6 178 117 345 GPS % 8.1 4.6 1.7 51.6 
 
33.9 100.0 
N 363 301 144 298 823 588 2’517 Total % 14.4 12.0 5.7 11.8 32.7 23.4 100.0 
 
Source: NCCR “Democracy, IP16 “smart-voting 2.0” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/research/module5/smart-
voting/smart-voting). 
Remarks: 1) Only the major five parties in Switzerland plus the Green-liberals have been included in this table. 2) CVP = 
Christian-democrats; FDP = Liberal-democrats; SVP = National-conservatives; SP = Social democrats; GPS = Greens; 
GLP = Green-liberals. 3) The Green-liberals is a new party and has not yet run in the 2003 elections. 
 
It is important to look at the data in Table 6 with great caution. Although the 
quality of our data sample is sufficient to conduct analyses about smartvote users, 
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the data sample is not at all suited for analyses with regard to the general outcome 
of the elections. 
Among the smartvote users of the five major parties a remarkable number 
of voters changed their vote to the Green-liberals who were competing for the first 
time in national elections in 2007. The percentage values indicate that the 
influence of smartvote also has certain limits. The vast majority of voters are 
switching their vote between parties, which are relatively close to each other with 
regard to their ideological position. The largest flow of voters can be found 
between the Greens and the Social democrats on the left side of the political 
spectrum, and between the Liberals and the National-conservatives on the right 
side. The Christian-democrats as the classic centre party gains and looses voters to 
both sides. In contrast to that, flows of voters between the parties on the poles are 
rather small. 
If we look at the votes received and lost by the different parties due to 
smartvote users we find on the winner side the Green-liberals (plus 588 votes) 
followed by the Greens (plus 478 votes) and the Christian-democrats (plus 129 
votes). Among the loosing parties are, first of all, the Social democrats (minus 
975 votes) followed by the Liberal-democrats (minus 176 votes) and the National-
conservatives (minus 44 votes). These findings should not be overrated due to the 
mentioned problems of the data sample, but they indicate, which party had gained 
and which party had lost votes through smartvote. Furthermore, these results – at 
least in general – coincide with the results of the elections. The Greens, the 
Green-liberals, and to a very minor extent the Christian-democrats increased their 
share of votes in accordance to the tendency revealed in our sample. The same is 
true on the side of the parties who lost the elections, the Social democrats and the 
Liberal-democrats. However, for the National-conservatives our figures reveal a 
slight loss, whereas in reality they considerably increased their share of votes (see 
Lutz 2008). 
Since the sample of smartvote users under scrutiny is not fully 
representative for all smartvote users and even less for all voters (e.g. we know 
that voters of left wing parties are strongly overrepresented) the lack of a full 
correspondence with the results of the elections is not astonishing. The figures, 
however, confirm our assumption, that smartvote had a certain impact on the 
outcome of the elections in 2007. In order to establish the real extent of the 
impact, however, we would not only have to know more about the 
representativeness of our sample, but also about the voters who were inclined to 
vote for another party and did not change their electoral decisions against the 
results of the received voting recommendation. 
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Conclusions 
 
VAAs have become increasingly popular and have emerged as indispensable 
elements in pre-election periods (Marschall and Schmidt 2010). But up to now 
only very few studies have focused on the impact of VAAs on the actual electoral 
choice of their users. In this paper we addressed the question whether there is such 
an impact or not, based on the example of the Swiss VAA smartvote. 
We found strong evidence that smartvote users are in deed affected by the 
voting advice they receive. 67% of voters using the tool stated that it influenced 
their party choice. This figure is several times higher compared with the findings 
of similar studies from other countries (Marschall 2005, Kees and van der Kolk 
2007, Walgrave et al. 2008, and Rusuuvirta and Rosema 2009). We found further 
confirmation for our findings by additional analyses based on swing voters. We 
could show that the use of smartvote during the 2007 election campaign had a 
significant positive correlation with being a swing voter. However, we had to deal 
with several problems with regard to the quality of the available data (e.g. self-
selection processes among respondents, or lack of responsiveness). Thus, we can 
only provide first and no final answers, especially as far as the overall impact on 
the electoral outcome is concerned. 
With regard to further research on this topic, we suggest at least three 
aspects from where future studies should proceed. First, it is necessary to improve 
the quality of available data. Most studies use only data from online surveys with 
all the well-known problems of lacking representativeness. Thus, studies should 
use combined online and offline data whenever possible. The study of Walgrave 
et al. (2008) for the 2004 Belgian elections demonstrates impressively the 
advantages of such a research design. Second, regarding the large differences 
between our findings on the impact of smartvote and the findings in other studies 
the search for an explanation of these differences scholars should pay more 
attention to international comparisons. In order to support comparative studies 
research projects on VAAs should intensify their cooperation. A first step could 
be to develop comparable questionnaires and data sets. Third, with a view to the 
results presented in this paper and indicating a clear impact of VAAs on the 
electoral choice the question whether this leads to better voting decisions or not 
becomes increasingly pressing. 
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